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Abstract: In his article, "Analyzing East/West Power Politics in Comparative Cultural Studies," 
William H. Thornton acknowledges culture as a central force on the geopolitical map and 
undertakes at once to preserve the strategic potency of political realism and to move beyond the 
"billiard ball" externality of both neo- and traditional realisms. Although Huntington and Fukuyama 
are taken seriously on the question of East/West power politics, Thornton develops a world view by 
grounding balance-of-power politics in national and local (not just civilizational) social reality. 
Further, Thornton argues against external democratic teleologies both Huntington and Fukuyama 
have imposed on the cultural Other. The thrust of Thornton's argumentation goes beyond the 
monolithic fallacies of political modernism, namely, political realism on the one hand and today's 
"reverse domino" globalization on the other. Once political realism takes this postmodern turn, it 
confronts the agonistic realities that killed the New World Order in its infancy. Although 
Huntington's Clash of Civilizations also confronted these grim realities, but did so in terms of a 
negative and retreatist realism. For Thornton, in the post-Cold War world that Huntington well 
describes but declines to fully engage, any effective realism must temper cultural agonistics with 
Bakhtinian cultural dialogics.  
William H. Thornton, "Analyzing East/West Power Politics in Comparative Cultural Studies"  page 2 of 12 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 2.3 (2000): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol2/iss3/3> 
 
William H. THORNTON 
 
Analyzing East/West Power Politics in Comparative Cultural Studies  
 
In the post-Cold War thought of Samuel Huntington, culture has supplanted ideology as the 
shaping force of global politics ("Erosion" 39). Unlike the postmodern culturalist, who celebrates 
"difference" as an unequivocal virtue, Huntington's cultural politics is marked by multipolar and 
multicivilizational strife (Huntington, Clash 21). Nevertheless he partakes in the cultural imperative 
that has become almost synonomous with postmodernism in foreign affairs: international relations, 
security studies, and international economics (Mazarr 177). Political realists find themselves in a 
bind, for it was on their watch that culture was strictly marginalized (Lapid 3). 
 Drawing on the realist wing of comparative cultural studies, this paper explores the place of 
culture in East/West power politics. It undertakes to preserve the strategic potency of political 
realism while putting culture back on Asia's geopolitical map. This requires that "classical" and 
"neo-" realism alike be revised in favor of a new "cultural realism": a post-Cold War melding of 
geopolitical strategy and geocultural negotiation, or what Joseph Nye has called "hard power" and 
"soft power" (181). As here employed, the term "cultural realism" carries a double meaning, tied 
at once to geopolitical and literary/cultural discourses. Its concern with the emic channels of local 
knowledge owes much to postmodern realism in cultural theory. The politics of postmodern realism 
-- as developed in my Cultural Prosaics: The Second Postmodern Turn and previous studies such 
as "Cultural Prosaics" and "Cross-Cultural" -- is congruent with Bakhtinian cultural dialogics rather 
than the epistemological anarchy of deconstructionist or Foucauldian theory (see Thornton Cultural, 
Chapter Six). The latter school of thought powerfully influenced Edward Said, but could not be 
sustained where Said turned his attention to the particulars of cultural politics. His Covering Islam, 
as Bryan Turner points out, is built upon a solidly realist epistemology (6).  
 On its geopolitical side, cultural realism is a manifestation of what Yosef Lapid and Friedrich 
Kratochwil call, in their anthology of that title, The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory 
(1996). The term "cultural realism" has been applied specifically to Chinese cultural politics by 
Alastair Johnston (1995), who argues that a tradition of realpolitik lies beneath China's cloak of 
Confucian-Mencian moderation. This inclines China to be much faster than most states to use force 
in territorial disputes. Johnston considers this cultural proclivity to be heightened by improvements 
in China's military capabilities. Here I broaden the application of "cultural realism" to the whole 
question of East/West geopolitics, qualifying rather than replacing the standard realist concern 
with balance of power relations. Johnston's insights, for example, lend cultural depth to the realist 
admonitions of Bernstein and Munro (1997) concerning China's destabilizing impact on the current 
Asian balance of power. Globalists tend to overlook the inertia of the bureaucratic and 
authoritarian tradition that traces to the Qin dynasty, and the isolationism that traces to the Ming 
(builders of the Great Wall). In this study, however, cultural realism is equally concerned with 
traditional and emerging relations between political cultures, e.g., the Chinese and the Vietnamese. 
It is thus the perfect medium for "soft power" analysis.  
 This "soft" realism offers a timely corrective to the cultural tunnel vision of both globalism and 
classical realism. The latter, according to Hans Morgenthau, has been distinguished by the 
subordination of all factors that lie outside a rational calculation of "interest defined in terms of 
power" (Morgenthau 5). This is supposed to render politics "autonomous" by purging realism of 
"irrational" elements such as religion and moral valuations. "Neo-" or "structural" realism, as 
developed by Kenneth Waltz (1979), begins with that same purgation but moves farther toward 
what is considered a scientific geopolitics, one in which the basic balancing act of realism operates 
systemically and without any necessary conscious intent (see Sheehan 194; Forde 142). Francis 
Fukuyama denigrates realism for treating "nation-states like billiard balls, whose internal contents, 
hidden by opaque shells, are irrelevant in predicting their behavior. ... International politics, then, 
is not about the interaction of complex and historically developing human societies, nor are wars 
about clashes of values. ... [Nonetheless the] earlier generation of realists like Morgenthau, 
Kennan, Niebuhr, and Kissinger allowed some consideration of the internal character of states to 
enter into their analyses, and could therefore give a better account of the reasons for international 
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conflict than the later academic school of "structural" realists. The former at least recognized that 
conflict had to be driven by a human desire for domination, rather than from the mechanical 
interaction of a system of billiard balls" (End 248 and 256).  
 In The Clash of Civilizations (1996), Huntington likewise points the way towards a revised 
realism where "internal contents" count as much or more than external mechanics. Thus 
Huntington implants culture or "civilization" in the very heart of realism -- if only negatively, by 
way of a sweeping cultural agonistics. The stress he gives to intractable conflict undermines the 
democratic trajectory of his previous book, The Third Wave (1991), where he granted the problem 
of a geopolitical rent between East and West, yet clung to his modernist optimism (310). As late as 
1991, then, it could still be said that he broadly concurred with democratic optimists such as 
Fukuyama, Rueschemeyer, and Di Palma (see works cited) on the thrust of liberal democratic 
globalization. By 1995, however, Malcolm Waters should have qualified his linkage of Huntington 
with Fukuyama's liberal democratic teleology (Waters 118-19); for Huntington's Foreign Affairs 
article of 1993 had clearly marked his cultural turn. This shift is all the more dramatic because his 
previous work was so often the epitome of cultural myopia. Thirty years before, in Political Order 
in Changing Societies, he famously overlooked the moral and cultural weaknesses of Soviet 
modernism, viz., the destabilization that was sure to erupt in a system built on the hard politics of 
lies, militarism, and ethnic repression (see Lane).  
 Just as he had been too pessimistic regarding the staying power of the Soviet system, he was 
now too trusting of the new democratic teleology. That optimism, however, was nowhere to be 
found in his incendiary Foreign Affairs article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" His subsequent book, 
which dropped the question mark in the title, details the ethnic and civilizational factors that 
fracture nations even as they threaten to culturally fuse whole regions, such as East Asia, against 
the West. Although Huntington's credentials as a realist are a solid fixture of Cold War history, the 
germ of his cultural turn can be traced to his 1968 classic, Political Order in Changing Societies. 
There he argued that it was simply unrealistic to press developing countries to become instant 
democracies when they lacked any semblance of democratic traditions. Hence, given the grim 
realities of Third World cultural politics, strong central authority must first be established. 
Whatever its intent, Political Order was widely read as a case for the realist suspension of 
Wilsonian idealism in foreign affairs. Walden Bello points out that it quickly became the handbook 
for a whole generation of development-minded officials in organizations such as the State 
Department, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. dominated World Bank (33). 
In Clash, Huntington easily disposes of the non-cultural competition within realism by noting that 
by their pristine logic Western Europe (either by classical realist design or neorealist structural 
reflex) would have coalesced with the Soviet Union against the U.S. in the late 1940s (24). 
Likewise, in the post-Cold War world, the core states of non-Western regions should logically unite 
against America and the West. This has been attempted, but its force is limited by the constant 
factionalism that stems from deep cultural/civilizational distrust (185). 
 One can credit the cultural turn of Huntington's realism while rejecting the fatalism of his 
"Atlanticist" retreat from Asian cultural politics (see Huntington, Clash 312) -- a retreat that would 
leave as little room for the art of diplomacy as does neorealism. By rejecting that retreat and 
neorealist positivism alike, this study keeps diplomacy in the geopolitical game and in that respect 
moves closer to classical realism. Where it profoundly differs is in its focus on culture as a vital 
element of political reality. In the tradition of Vico's verum-factum principle (whereby we know 
history or culture far better than nature, insofar as we create the former), cultural realism makes 
no apology for not being "scientific." The one element that will be salvaged from Huntington's 
cultural retreat is his recoil from any attempt to impose Western values and institutions as a 
blueprint for global development. Since most "globalism" -- here defined as the ideology of those 
who "are in the habit of praising the current process of globalization" (Salih 137; my emphasis) -- 
follows that Orientalist blueprint in all but name (see Waters 3), this study is in that sense anti-
globalist. Especially it opposes what Huntington calls "Davos Culture": The convergent interests 
and values of the small global elite that controls virtually all of the world's dominant international 
institutions (Huntington, Clash 57). However, in place of Huntington's cultural agonistics, my 
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weapon of choice against Davos Globalism is a realism built on cultural dialogics. For me this 
involves a post-Bakhtinian commitment to crosscultural engagement, including political 
engagement. In such a dialogics, cultural identities take shape very much as do individual voices: 
"in response to and in anticipation of other voices" (Bialostosky 214). This makes for a fluid 
identity, but hardly a vacuous one. As Caryl Emerson convincingly argues, Bakhtin's dialogics kept 
the self intact, since it is only by asserting one's own uniqueness that one can hope to engage a 
unique Other dialogically (110). Thus the twin acts of taking a stand and interacting become 
integral to the twin processes of identity formation and political action. I therefore depart from 
Emerson, in Cultural Prosaics and elsewhere, by extracting from Bakhtin the ingredients of a 
political counterdiscourse that she would not countenance. This political grounding avoids the 
cultural relativist trap of holding that on all issues one cultural perspective is as good or just as 
another -- an attitude that has permitted such pressing global issues as human rights and the 
environment to be labeled "Western" and hence "imperialist." These agonistic labels are designed 
to block communication and freeze geopolitical discourse in an East/West or South/North mode. 
The dialogic reach of cultural realism equips it to cross those agonistic lines to deal with vital 
transnational issues that have no place in classical realism or neorealism.  
 One such issue is global environmentalism. The rise of environmental consciousness has given 
"Third World countries an important potential source of blackmail, with countries (not all of them 
very poor) demanding to be paid to carry out environmental measures which are actually in their 
own interest as well as everyone else's" (Beloff 5). Insofar as global ecology is a moral or in any 
case a transnational concern, neither classical realism nor neorealism is equipped to handle it; 
whereas cultural realism is perfectly suited to the task. As with all realism (Lentner 39), one of 
cultural realism's primary concerns is assuring security. But in an increasingly global age, security 
can no longer be restricted to "national interest" in the limited sense. And just as there is now a 
place for "green" issues within realism, so too there is a growing "realo" wing within Green parties. 
These groups recognize that although the state has often worked against the environment, its 
powers are "needed to match the scale of ecological problems. ... [and to] counter corporate 
power" (Dryzek 35-36). The environmental recklessness of international organizations like the 
World Bank and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a matter of record. Between 
1976 and 1986, for example, the World Bank funneled $600 million into deforestation / 
resettlement programs in Indonesia alone. The result was massive erosion that "degraded the soil 
to the point where it could not sustain subsistence agriculture or even absorb water" (Bello 53). 
John Dryzek points out that in 1991 "a GATT committee declared that the United States' ban on 
imported tuna caught in ways that caused the deaths of large numbers of dolphins contravened 
the GATT. If a state wishes to guarantee by law or regulation that its food imports do not contain 
unsafe levels of pesticides, then that, too, will be a violation of free trade" (81). 
 Meanwhile, environmentalism has taken a postmodern turn in the direction of a new 
moral/cultural realism. Its goals are no longer tied so closely to an empirical and hence material 
frame of reference, exclusive of the moral and aesthetic concerns that are now embraced by "post-
environmentalism" (Eder 214-15). The result of these various trends is a remarkable fit between 
the new (as opposed to "neo") realism and the new ecology, including the new literary eco-
criticism. Clearly this is part of a broad postmodern shift from mere survival values to well-being 
values, and from achievement motivation to postmaterial motivation (see Inglehart 77). Once 
realism takes this postmodern turn, however, it confronts the agonistic realities that killed the 
"New World Order" in its infancy. At that point it faces a stark choice: Huntingtonesque retreat into 
cultural insularity or the development of a more "engaged" moral realism (as explored in my "Back 
to Basics"). What Huntington's Clash gives us is negative realism. In the post-Cold War world that 
Clash so well describes, but declines to fully engage, affirmative realism requires that cultural 
agonistics be tempered by cultural dialogics.  
 Cultural realism bypasses both sides of the East/West incommensurability argument, as 
propounded by Huntington on the Western side and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew on the side of 
"Asian values." Fortunately there are dialogic alternatives to both. Elsewhere, as part of my case 
against East Asian exceptionalism, I have contrasted the "Singapore model" of authoritarianism 
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with the democratic voice of Kim Dae Jung, Korea's inveterate dissident-turned-president (see 
Thornton, "Korea"). The coexistence of economic and political development in Kim's "Korean 
model" would free American foreign policy from the burden of choosing between the false 
antipodes of stability and social justice. That blighted choice was thought necessary during the 
Cold War, when the West hesitated to advance its own values for fear of driving developing 
countries into Moscow's camp (Kausikan 27).  
 The always dubious rationale for treating oppressive regimes as full strategic partners died with 
the Cold War. With it died, also, the rationale for a virulent strain of realism that helped produce -- 
in terms of genocide, ethnocide, and environmental apocalypse (see Bello, Chapter 7) -- the most 
destructive century in recorded history. Many, unfortunately, did not get the message. On 9 March 
1991, in the wake of the Gulf War, President Bush declared, "By God! We've kicked the Vietnam 
Syndrome once and for all. ... The specter of Vietnam has been forever buried in the desert sands 
of the Arabian peninsula" (qtd. in Long 397). By retreating from post-Cold War global imperatives, 
the "Vietnam syndrome" was indeed an invitation to trouble, and no realist should lament its 
passing. Unfortunately, the cultural sensitivity that attended that syndrome is also put at risk by 
the return of the old power politics. What is needed, in the absence of a new world order, is a via 
media between Fukuyama's dialogic liberalism and Huntington's undialogic realism. Huntington's 
agonistics stems from his still-modernist habit of treating whole cultures as reified systems. It 
must be granted that the agonistic worldviews of Hobbes and Huntington are in many ways closer 
to global reality, and especially Asian reality, than are dialogic alternatives such as the Grotian 
notion of a salutary society of nations (see Sheehan 11-12). Here my objective is simply to keep 
dialogics in the game by charting a course that is "in but not of" agonistics. The last effective 
metatheory of global peace -- based largely on a nuclear balance of terror -- could not survive the 
passing of the Cold War. Its heir apparent, Fukuyama's posthistorical vision of a New World Order, 
never materialized. History refused to go away. That is not to say that Fukuyama's liberal 
globalism is a feckless illusion. Rather, it is intertwined with its theoretical opposite, realism. Too 
often globalism turns out to be little more than a front for vested interests, while "realism" is but a 
euphemism for the purchase of stability or geopolitical advantage at any price. Theoretical 
distinctions between the two then evaporate. For example, the opposition one would expect 
between Clinton's manifest globalism and Kissinger's nominal realism all but vanishes where China 
is concerned.  
 The operative theory behind Clinton's China policy has been a market-obsessed economism 
that even Fukayama could not endorse (see Trust 34). This vision of unproblematic economic 
growth rests on the expansion and empowerment of the middle classes, which are expected in 
turn to demand political reform. Proponents of such economic prioritization often point to the 
development patterns of South Korea and Taiwan. However, as Kanishka Jayasuriya counters, 
Singapore and Malaysia could just as well be spotlighted in support of the opposite case. Both sing 
the praises of authoritarian "Asian values," despite the fact that each is "dominated by a party with 
strong middle class support ... Hence, those who suggest that Asian middle classes will demand 
greater liberalization are likely to be sorely disappointed. The Asian values ideology serves only to 
provide a comfortable canopy for this middle class" (Jayasuriya 88).  
 The unilateral privileging of economic over political liberalization in the Singapore model differs 
from Japanese economism in that the Japanese people have clearly given their consent to these 
priorities. In that sense the authority behind the Japanese model could be called, if not quite 
bilateral, then at least top-down by consent. It is the more forceful removal or manipulation of 
consent which distinguishes the "Asian values" model from the Japanese. In Singapore's case this 
hegemonic turn had its debut in 1963 with the PAP (People's Action Party) Operation Cold Store: 
The arrest of one hundred opposition leaders. Since that time all Singaporeans have been subject 
to constant political surveillance (see Chua 16 and 44). But for the most part PAP has operated 
through the less direct means of intense media control and a unilateral scripting of tradition. 
If  "other" Asian values have been politically dormant in Japan, they have been forcefully 
suppressed in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and virtually crushed in Myanmar and the 
People's Republic of China. Here the de facto motto might go beyond "growth first" to "growth 
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only." This dictum was spelled out by Deng Xiaopeng, and its place in post-Deng CCP ideology is 
hardly less secure. By no means, however, does this development strategy stop at the boundary 
of  "Asian values." It is a potent factor throughout the Third World, or what is increasingly -- 
metaphorically more than geographically -- called the South, where authoritarianism is primarily 
an instrument for suppressing the unrest that is bound to erupt from gross inequality in 
distribution. Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger asserted that the "notion of the Northern rich and the Southern poor has been 
shattered" ("Common Response" 3). Indeed, many countries that fall under this "Southern" rubric 
did make impressive gains prior to the 1980s in terms of GDP per capita. Only on closer analysis, 
with attention shifted to the actual distribution of gains, does the "Southern" argument strike 
home. As the South Commission reported in 1990, inequalities "tended to widen as the economy 
grew and became more industrialized.... Increasingly, the rich and powerful in countries of the 
South were able to enjoy the life-style and consumption patterns of developed countries of the 
North. But large segments of the population experienced no significant improvement in their 
standard of living, while being able to see the growing affluence of the few" (qtd. in Thomas 5).  
 Consequently, the stage is set for what Jayasuriya -- generalizing a term that Jeffrey Herf 
applied to Nazi Germany -- calls "reactionary modernism" (82-84) -- a condition of radical divorce 
between economic and technical modernization, on the one hand, and political (liberal democratic) 
modernization on the other. Where cultural or civilizational friction reaches the proportions 
described by Huntington's Clash, we can expect reactionary modernism to be the rule rather than 
the exception in developing countries. In India, for example, Hindu fundamentalism is less a threat 
to material modernization than to the secular state and the whole democratic apparatus. Countries 
such as Algeria, Nigeria, and Sudan have reverted to military authoritarianism, while Egypt, Peru, 
and Russia have shifted to repressive state controls. Elsewhere, as in Guatemala, Argentina, 
Uruguay, and (until very recently) Chile, the ongoing veto power of the military has reduced 
democracy to a stage prop (Shaw and Quadir 49).  
 It is no accident that Clinton's development strategy -- built on the assumptions of vintage 
modernization theory -- bears remarkable resemblance to Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Both 
lay stress on the cultivation of the middle classes as the alpha and omega of development. This 
class/ic error -- a naive faith in class alone as the engine of progress -- had its first incarnation in 
the Old Left notion of the proletariat's innate progressivism. After the German working class threw 
its support behind Nazism and the war, Frankfurt School critical theory laid that class/ic blunder to 
rest. Soon, however, it had a second, liberal incarnation in the American vision of the middle class 
as the "vital center" (as Arthur Schlesinger called it) not only of US-American political culture but 
of global development. Castro believed that insofar as Kennedy's Alliance for Progress rose above 
the vested interests of corporations, foreign regimes and the Pentagon, it was doomed to fail 
(Schlesinger 147). And Castro was right. At least Kennedy's naiveté can be defended on the 
grounds that -- apart from the experience of fascism, which could be dismissed as a twentieth-
century aberration -- reactionary modernization had not yet made its full global debut. Clinton has 
no such excuse. Indeed, as Richard Rorty argues in Achieving our Country (1988), US-American 
society is itself being split into a cosmopolitan upper crust and a downwardly mobile remainder. 
America's own "vital center" is decomposing even as American foreign policy strives to create new 
"vital centers" around the world. This might be a harmlessly quixotic enterprise except that extant 
power elites are imagined to be the vanguard of these proto-democratic "centers." Likewise, 
growth of any kind is imagined to be progress. One of the chief architects of Clinton's China policy, 
Anthony Lake, a self-described "centrist," so closely equates U.S. interest with Chinese economic 
growth that he has pressed the U.S. not to expose Chinese exports of nuclear materials to Third 
World clients (see Heilbrunn <http://www.tnr.com/textonly/032497/txtheilbrunn032497.html> 
[inactive]). 
 Whether judged by a Wilsonian or realist standard, Kissinger's current stance on China is no 
less odious. In 1987 he was encouraged by China's ambassador to the U.S. to found the American 
China Society, through which he has become one of the Chinese government's most powerful 
defenders. He is credited with personally persuading former House Speaker Newt Gingrich to drop 
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his support for Taiwan independence, and for convincing the Clinton administration to disconnect 
the issues of trade and human rights (see Judis 
<http://www.tnr.com/textonly/031097/txtjudis031097.html>). Whatever argument might be 
made for these policies from a globalist perspective, there is no reconciling them with any form of 
realism -- not at a time when China is the paramount source of Asia's growing imbalance of power 
-- a fact that is only compounded by the prospect of Korea's reunification (see "Japan"). This 
raises the question of the purity of Kissinger's realist credentials even during the Cold War. Legend 
has it that his policies dislodged the illusion of monolithic communism from American foreign policy. 
In fact, Kissinger was inclined toward a highly ideological reading of world affairs. Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan points out that, as Secretary of State, Kissinger warned that America must "face the 
stark reality that the [Communist] challenge is unending" (qtd. in Moynihan 145). The context of 
this almost eschatological utterance was America's by then obvious failure in the Vietnam War. 
The domino theory, the most commonly stated rationale for escalating the war in the first place 
(Kolko 75), was being justly discredited by a new brand of culturalism, as in, for example, Walker 
Conner's case for the vital political role of ethnic heterogeneity in Asian political cultures (see 
Conner; and, specific to Vietnam, FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake). At this of all times, Kissinger blew 
second wind into America's Cold War ideology by naturalizing its communist adversary.  
 Nonetheless, Kissinger recognized the limits of the domino theory as applied to Vietnam 
(Kissinger, Years 82) and China, which he perceived as a nationalistic entity vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union and North Vietnam alike. Kissinger was aware that China secretly condoned U.S. operations 
in Laos, despite (or even because of) its negative impact on North Vietnam (Kissinger, Years 58). 
He favorably cites André Malraux's belief that China's support of North Vietnam was an 
"imposture," for the historical animosities between China and North Vietnam ran too deep 
(Kissinger, White House 1052). In global balance of power terms, it was no secret that China 
feared the possibility of Vietnam becoming a Soviet satellite state, thus completing the 
encirclement of China (Kolko 419). If Kissinger's early China policy can be credited with promoting 
a global balance of power, it now lives on as an effete mockery of realism; for China is fast 
becoming the major agent of Asian instability. By any "realist" logic, the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the concomitant rise of China should have prompted an immediate shift in Kissinger's position 
on China. This naturally raises suspicions that his refusal to budge an inch in that direction is 
directly related to the operations of the firm he founded, Kissinger Associates, which assists 
corporate clients in setting up business ties in China. Thus Kissinger the arch-realist has become, 
in actual practice, a closet globalist.  
 Having served as president of Kissinger Associates, former Secretary of State Lawrence 
Eagleburger now works for a law firm that likewise helps businesses to obtain contracts in China; 
and another president of Kissinger Associates, former National Security Advisor Brent Snowcroft, 
freely mixes public policy advice with private business connections via his consulting firm, the 
Scowcroft Group, which operates out of the same office complex as the nonprofit policy group he 
founded: The Forum for International Policy. In 1996 he helped Dean O'Hare, chairman of the 
Chubb insurance group, secure a meeting with Chinese Premier Li Peng. All the while, not 
surprisingly, he has defended China assiduously on issues such as MFN and Chinese sales of 
nuclear material to Pakistan, which he has publicly blamed -- through a bizarre twist of logic -- on 
U.S. non-proliferation legislation (see Judis), as if China did it to save face when confronted with 
evil imperialist pressures. Next to Kissinger himself, however, the most egregious China-card 
player is former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Kissinger's aide during the opening of China. 
Haig has the distinction of having been the only prominent American to join the October 1989 
celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the PRC -- i.e., to join Deng Xiaoping in Tiananmen 
Square just four months after the Tiananmen massacre. His continuing role in the defense of MFN 
and as a critic of anyone who defends Taiwan has earned him a good deal more than praise from 
the Chinese. Deng saluted his "courage," but what counts are the contracts: One of the major 
clients of his consulting group, Worldwide Associates, has hauled in billions of dollars in business 
deals with the Chinese (see Judis). Haig is not one to be concerned about theoretical 
contradictions, but more might be expected from his realist mentor, Kissinger.  
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 With the end of the Cold War, the brutal amorality of Kissingeresque realism has lost whatever 
justification it could ever claim. So too, its cultural indifference renders it obsolete, for culture has 
emerged as a prime mover of world affairs (see Kahn x). Fukuyama has managed to keep his 
version of globalism in the game by taking a modest cultural turn, blirring the stock association of 
economism with rationality and culture with irrationality (see Trust 37-38). Perhaps it would be fair 
to call his position a cultural globalism, as far removed from unalloyed globalism as cultural 
realism is from traditional realism. Kissinger, however, holds fast to the tablets he brought down 
from the mountain. His hard line realism treats culture as local color, style, or sentiment rather 
than political substance. In his Washington years he perpetuated Cold War logic by putting 
containment in an older realist package: The classic balance of power that tries to reduce 
international relations to a cold calculation of interest. Moynihan wryly notes that Kissinger's 
"realism" put him out of touch with the inner substance of political reality (145-46). It certainly 
obscured the cultural and civilizational realities that suffuse Moynihan's Pandaemonium (1993) and 
Huntington's Clash. Where East Asia is concerned, responses to this cultural challenge range from 
globalist denial, on the one hand, to militant agonistics on the other. Huntington's thesis, for 
example, receives a concerted challenge from the collection of papers contained in Techno-
Security in an Age of Globalization: Perspectives from the Pacific Rim, edited by Denis Simon 
(1997). One reviewer, Steven Rosefield, points out that these papers collectively comprise a 
national security paradigm consistent with "Lester Thurow's and Francis Fukuyama's notions about 
the global triumph of capitalism and the end of history. ... Traditional international security 
concerns, it is intimated, have become obsolete. Imperialism is dead, great nations are war averse, 
economic systems don't matter (because there is only capitalism), and Huntington's clash of 
civilizations is a mirage. What really matters today, the authors variously contend, are 
technological threats ... and other lower intensity quarrels" (751). 
 At the opposite pole there is the all-too-cogent realist manifesto of Richard Bernstein and Ross 
Munro (The Coming Conflict with China). In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Bernstein and Munro 
attempt to distinguish their approach from that of Huntington, on the ground that theirs is strictly 
geopolitical rather than cultural or civilizational ("Coming" 21). That distinction, however, runs 
aground on several points. First, it is granted that part of the reason for China's new assertiveness 
is its traditional view of itself as Asia's preeminent power (22). That is a deeply ingrained cultural 
viewpoint, entirely consistent with Huntington's thesis. Second, Bernstein and Munro's working 
assumption that China will not readily go the route of democracy, despite its rising affluence, is 
based on the absence of such key ingredients as a tradition of limited government, individual 
rights, independent judiciary, etc. (26-27). Are these absences not part of China's political culture? 
Notions such as the consent of the governed and the will of the majority are not just ideas, but 
deeply rooted cultural institutions. A thriving market economy can be conducive to the formation 
of such institutions. Perhaps it is a necessary but insufficient prerequisite for their development. 
The bottom line, as Bernstein and Munro point out, is that China treats opposition as treason. So 
far that cultural fact has not proved incompatible with China's new techno-nationalism. Bernstein 
and Munro, in any case, have the good fortune of not being the classical realists they imagine 
themselves to be.  
 One reason why their warning is not being heeded is likewise culture-related. Americans view 
Asia as a far more alien place than Europe. Even if they see China as a budding superpower, they 
are not inclined to see her regional power as posing so serious a threat to their culturally defined 
interests as would an equivalent military threat on the European side. This bias skews Americans' 
sense of shifting global priorities. As Fareed Zakaria argues, two simple facts define today's 
geopolitics: "Russian weakness and Chinese strength. ... Yet increasingly the Clinton 
Administration's foreign policy looks as if it were intended to meet precisely the opposite 
challenges. ... the Administration is spending vast amounts of time, energy, money and political 
capital to deter [Russia] from launching an invasion of Central Europe. China, on the other hand, is 
surging economically, bulking up its armed forces and becoming more assertive by the day" 
(Zakaria <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/zakaria.htm> [inactive]). Early in May, 1998 
India shocked the world by conducting three nuclear tests. It was generally assumed that this 
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breach of nuclear nonproliferation was aimed almost exclusively at Pakistan; but for Henry 
Sokolski -- the Bush Defense Department's top official for nuclear nonproliferation issues -- it 
amounted to "an act of impatience with failed American efforts to stop China and North Korea from 
developing and spreading strategic weapons": Sokolski quotes The Times of India's comment that 
"by the time the Clinton Administration wakes up to the danger posed by the China-Pakistan-North 
Korean axis, it will be too late for India" (Sokolski 
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sokolski.htm>). This view gains credibility in the light of 
India's former conciliation towards Pakistan. Despite friction over Kashmir, the two antagonists 
had renewed ministerial contacts and, guided by Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral, were 
seeking more economic cooperation (International Institute for Strategic Studies 146). The U.S., 
however, was sluggish in revising policies formed when Pakistan was a Cold War ally and India a 
leader of "nonaligned" nations and a major recipient of Soviet economic and military aid (Kennedy 
507). By the 1990s, if not before, that Cold War mindset was worse than obsolete. In combination 
with Clinton's China policy it contributed to renewed militarism in the region. Likewise, the 
perpetuation of a Cold War China policy is aggravating an already dangerous imbalance in 
Northeast Asian (NEA) geopolitics. Even as the Cold War abates between the two Koreas, new 
power configurations must be taken into account. By the early 1990s, thought was being given to 
an ASEAN-type NEA unity. Like AFTA in the south, one goal of this accord was a trade bloc that 
would exclude the U.S., Australia, and Canada.  
 From 1967 to 1989 ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations: Indonesia, Singapore, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, plus Brunei in 1984 and Vietnam in 1995) was the only 
regional political organization in Asia (Godement 281). A first step toward a more globally attuned 
regionalism was taken by APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), which was founded in 1989 
under Western auspices. The U.S. and Australia sought to circumvent trade barriers by 
transforming APEC from a mere consultive group into a formal trading bloc. Asian governments 
immediately perceived this as an attempt to saddle them with a U.S. free-trade package. Indeed, 
a key figure in the U.S. strategy was Fred Bergsten, who by no accident had also been a lobbyist 
for GATT and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area). ASEAN, which leaned heavily toward 
state-assisted capitalism rather than free trade, reacted to this Western initiative by shortening 
the timetable for their own AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) trade bloc. Another anti-Western shock 
wave erupted when Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia's prime minister, proposed an East Asia 
Economic Group (EAEG) under the aegis of Japan, with China and Korea invited but with the U.S., 
Australia, and Canada strictly excluded. Still another shock came when the Philippines shut down 
the American naval base at Subic Bay, to the tune of an anti-Western diatribe from the Philippine 
Senate president, Jovito Salonga: "Today we have summoned the political will to stand up and end 
470 years of foreign military presence in the Philippines" (Bello 3). Meanwhile the potential for a 
Northeast Asian (NEA) accord was being explored. The idea had obvious economic merit: Coupled 
with China's huge and affordable work force and Russia's abundant natural resources, the capital 
and technology of Japan and South Korea could be expected to turn the NEA region as a whole 
into an Asian "mega-tiger." By 1994, however, this dream had all but disintegrated (see Rozman 1, 
4). Gilbert Rozman points out that the prospect of NEA regionalism "brought to the forefront true 
civilizational divides" (22).  
 Fearing that Japan would turn NEA cooperation into its own "flying-goose" cartel, China 
upgraded her diplomatic relations with Moscow, thus putting both Tokyo and Washington on edge. 
Increasingly, however, the U.S. took the brunt of Chinese invective (Rozman 20). Since NEA 
multilateralism tends to vary inversely with U.S. diplomatic strength in the region, it was not good 
news for the U.S. when, in the middle of Clinton's first term, China's Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji got a 
warm reception on his trip to Tokyo, when Japan's Hosokawa reciprocated with a visit to Beijing, 
or when President Kim Young Sam of Korea visited both ("Time" 19). An even worse omen was the 
April 1997 Moscow summit between Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin, both of whom pledged support 
for a multilateral world order to block the hegemony of any state -- meaning, obviously, the U.S. 
(Wishnick 1049).  
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 What kept the U.S. in the game was the enormous distrust that every NEA power feels towards 
every other. This same distrust makes the June 2000 summit between North Korea's Kim Jung Il 
and the South's Kim Dae Jung a dubious blessing so far as regional stability is 
concerned.  Reunification would revive the centuries-old competition for hegemony over Korea 
(see "Japan"). Given the region's culturally ingrained distrust, the U.S. has a vital role to play as a 
counterbalance to resurgent Sino-centricism. This strategy, however, requires close attention to 
the minutia of cultural realism. To follow Huntington in his concentration on "civilizational" fault 
lines is already to miss those details: This would reproduce in cultural geopolitics the monolithic 
scale that encumbered domino theory logic, and with the same catastrophic results. Not only 
would it do a disservice to legitimate U.S. security concerns, but to the interests of all Asian 
nations under China's hegemonic shadow. Without outside support, weaker Rim countries will be 
pushed into a politics of accommodation where the center holds all too well, while stronger 
countries will be forced into a costly and perilous arms race. 
 By grounding balance-of-power politics in national and local (not just civilizational) social reality, 
the cultural realism of this article moves beyond Huntington and Fukuyama alike. It avoids the 
monolithic fallacies of political realism on the one hand and "reverse domino" globalization on the 
other. This affords a more effective realism, but, it must be granted, one which is still but a tool in 
a larger foreign policy schema. In terms of means and ends, it is still only a strategy -- a means in 
search of a suitable end (suitable, that is, to both poles of a given cultural dialogue). In 
forthcoming work I argue that the end most commensurate with cultural realism -- which I term 
"moral realism" -- gets past Huntington's negative, retreatist realism by re-engaging other political 
cultures on an ethical plane. In the spirit of post-Bakhtinian dialogics, rather than any neo-
imperialism (including, most emphatically, that of corporate globalization), this cultural realism 
turns Huntington's cultural isolationism on its head.  
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